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Abstract— This study aims to demonstrate empirically the 
effect of earnings aggressiveness, income smoothing, and 
earnings transparency on the cost of equity with earnings 
informativeness as moderating. The purpose of this 
research paper is to contribute an additional form of 
building knowledge about the cost of equity to provide 
empirical evidence that is more comprehensive in 
association with earnings aggressiveness, income 
smoothing, earnings transparency, and earnings 
informativeness. 
The test was conducted using secondary data from 
financial statement data. The data sample was taken from 
209 entities listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange unless 
the company was in addition to property and financial 
sector for the period 2011 to 2013 and was processed using 
multiple regression models. 
The methodology of this research is quantitative 
with the aim to see whether there are any relationships 
between variables. The results show that earnings 
aggressiveness and income smoothing have positive 
influences on the cost of equity, while earning 
transparency has a negative result against the same 
variable. When earning informativeness, the moderating 
variable, is added to the three relationships, it brings in 
three different conclusions. First, the moderation weakens 
the positive relationship between earning aggressiveness 
and cost of equity. Second, the moderation strengthens the 
negative relationship between earnings transparency and 
cost of equity. And at last, the moderation does not have 
significance towards income smoothing and cost of equity.   
Keywords: earnings aggressiveness, income 
smoothing, earnings transparency, the cost of equity, and 
earnings informativeness. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Companies facing competitive business climate are 
demanded to become more creative and innovative to maintain 
the continuity of their business. Innovations can be done by 
making changes to the product or by launching new products 
or by expanding sources of business in order to increase 
market share and increase the company's revenue. Companies 
that want to be competitive and maintain the continuity of 
their business require additional capital. One of the 
alternatives is for the company to place its name in capital 
markets with the objective to obtain additional funds from 
investors and creditors whenever the company needs it [1]. 
Companies that are already listed on the capital market must 
pay attention to the cost of equity because its calculation is 
useful to produce the right investment decisions so that these 
investments generate returns that can improve the welfare of 
the stakeholders [2] . 
After the financial crisis [the Dot-Com Bubble], the 
transparency and quality of corporate disclosures faced 
concern among members of the business community. 
According to the publicity of the World Bank and the Asian 
Wall Street Journal in 1999, companies listed on the Asian 
countries were still grappling with the problem of low 
transparency [3]. Indonesia, which faced financial crisis from 
mid-1998, was no exception. Straight-out financial 
transparency of companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (BEI) has become the focus of investors who are 
looking for increased transparency in accordance with 
international accounting standards. 
This study focuses on accrual management, more 
specifically discretionary accruals. The discretionary policy is 
a policy management that is flexible in controlling the 
accounting numbers. Accrual discretion by management 
should be tied to the phenomenon of economic enterprises. 
For example, a company in the business sector which some of 
its accounts experiences an increase or decrease in the 
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provision for impairment of trade receivables are also likely to 
rise or drop in correspond to company’s economic 
phenomenon. Meaning that if the condition of company’s 
economic is down or its performance is down, it tends to 
increase the provision for impairment of trade receivables. So, 
if provision for impairment of trade receivables turns down 
then it is considered as a part of economic enterprises 
phenomenon. But sometimes management makes 
discretionary accruals that do not fit the economic enterprise. 
The description above has provided the motivation 
why the study was conducted: first, there are still differences 
in the results of studies linking earnings in formativeness, 
aggressiveness earnings, income smoothing, and earnings 
transparency, as well as the cost of equity. Second, research on 
the transparency of income based on variety of sources in 
Indonesia have not been investigated, while there are research 
carried out by the transparency of the new earnings [4] and 
[5]. Third, reference [6] and  [7] show that when managers do 
accrual accounting manipulations, it requires interpretation of 
the discretionary accruals that is useful to the users of 
financial statements. Reference [8] encourages that are 
selected managers’ decisions to be taken in order to improve 
earnings informativeness accounting by using discretionary 
accruals. Earnings informativeness in this case acts as a 
moderating variable with the argument that the policy of 
discretionary accruals made by management brings two 
consequences. First, if the discretionary accrual brings 
earnings informativeness, it will increase this variable and thus 
gain more quality and make cost of equity low. Second, when 
the discretionary accrual does not bring earnings 
informativeness (uninformative earnings), it will reduce the 
using of moderator in the accrual policy, thereby increase the 
cost of equity. This research is aimed to contribute an 
additional form of building knowledge about the cost of equity 
in intention to provide empirical evidence that is more 
comprehensive in association with the earnings 
aggressiveness, income smoothing, earnings transparency, and 
earning informativeness, which refers to companies listed on 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI) and in line with the 
World Bank and the Asian Wall Street Journal publicity where 
Asian companies are still grappling with the problem of lack 
of information transparency  [3].  
Indonesia was included in countries facing monetary 
crisis in mid 1998. One of the reasons was because some 
companies did earnings management that failed to reflect real 
economic value of the company. By that reason, investors 
have been looking for companies listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange with international-standardized financial 
transparency. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section III describes 
the sample and variable measurement; Section IV provides 
evidence on the earning aggressiveness, income smoothing, 
and earnings transparency on the cost of equity and earnings 
informativeness as moderating. Section V conducts sensitivity 
analyses. Section VI is the conclusion of the paper. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPHOTESIS
DEVELOPMENT 
Earnings Aggressiveness is defined as a management action 
that has a tendency to defer acceleration of income and profit, 
which subsequently impacts earnings informativeness [9]. 
Earning aggressiveness is a management action related to 
earnings manipulation [10]. 
When a company is doing earning aggressiveness, book value 
and profit at present time are higher, but it makes profit 
forecast low and cost of capital (and or actual profit) increases. 
Earning aggressiveness policy can be done through 
discretionary accruals. A reason of doing accrual management 
is opportunistic behavior which relates to compensation. 
Income smoothing is defined as an attempt from the 
management to reduce abnormal variations in earnings to the 
extent allowed under the principles of sound-accounting and 
the policy of the firm itself [11]. Income smoothing is a 
management policy that report smooth profits at all time. 
When accounting profits are reported in an artificial smooth 
way, the number  fails to show the real economic performance 
therefore lowers earnings inforrnativeness.  
Reference [12] defines earnings transparency as an extent to 
which financial reports reveal an underlying economic entity 
in a way that it is readily understandable by those using the 
financial reports. Financial reports do not reflect how good 
earnings transparency is in helping investor assessing 
implications of earnings valuations and changes. This 
measurement is based on relations among stock price, equity 
book value and earnings in clean-surplus valuation. The 
measurement specifically uses R2 adjusted from annual cross 
section regression in earnings and its changes that are reflected 
in prices. 
According to [13] and [14], earnings informativeness defines 
as the amount of information about future earnings or cash 
flows included in current period of stock return. Based on 
above definition, present stock returns contain information of 
future profit or cash flow –which means stock prices are 
closely related to profit. Stock price information relates 
positively and parallel with profit. Stock prices reflect market 
mechanism based on supply and demand. Stock prices show 
stock market appraisal toward the company competence in 
gaining profit from time to time, managing risk of profit 
continuance and some other factors. In general, market value 
is affected with internal and external factors. Internal factors 
arises from within the company and can be controlled by it, 
such as solvability, growth opportunity and profitability. 
Earnings aggressiveness is also a management action related 
to earnings manipulation [10]. By increasing the accrual 
components and at the same time lowering the cost, profits are 
reported to be higher than the actual rate [15]. If companies do 
an appropriate counting, then the current-book value shows 
assets and a higher profit, but forecast earnings will be low 
and the cost of equity will be increased [16]. 
H1: Earnings aggressiveness generates a positive effect on 
the cost of equity. 
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When dividend yields are used as the basis for measuring the 
cost of equity, it can be presumed that the income smoothing 
has positive effect on the cost of equity. This is in line with 
research [17] which uses price-earnings growth that shows 
that earnings smoothing causes positive effects on the cost of 
equity, or, companies that tend to generate income smoothing 
will result in high cost of equity. 
H2: Income smoothing creates positive effect on the cost of 
equity. 
Companies that develop earnings transparency will be 
associated with a lower cost of equity because the 
transparency will mitigate the risk arising from information 
asymmetry and at the same time lowers the cost of equity. 
This comes as a result of commitment to improve the quality 
of financial statements, which mean the company’s focus is on 
applying accounting standards [18] ;[19]; and  [20]. 
H3: Earnings transparency negatively affects the cost of 
equity. 
In line with research [21] which shows that an accrual 
responds positively with earnings informativeness, then it is 
expected that using earnings iinformativeness as moderation 
can weaken a connection between earnings aggressiveness and 
cost of equity. Companies which report earnings 
aggressiveness are expected to use earnings informativeness 
through discretionary accrual to lower cost of equity. 
H4: Earnings informativeness weakens positive relation 
between earnings aggressiveness and cost of equity. 
Research [17], which used price-earnings-growth approach, 
shows that income smoothing effects positively to cost of 
equity. Companies that try to report their earnings using false 
smooth are expected to be weakened through earnings 
informativeness in discretionary accrual which at the end will 
lower cost of equity. 
H5: Earnings informativeness weakens positive relation 
between income smoothing and cost of equity. 
Reference [23] reports that information asymmetry relates 
positively to cost of equity. If earnings transparency has 
negative connection with accounting information, it will also 
relates negatively to the cost of equity. Reference [17] shows 
negative relation in measurement between cost of equity and 
earnings transparency. Meanwhile, reference [5] reveals 
positive connection between earnings transparency and cost of 
equity. A web-based financial reporting [earning transparency] 
responds positively to earnings informativeness and therefore 
reduces information asymmetry. 
H6: Earnings informativeness strengthens negative 
relation between earnings transparency and cost of equity. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Data Collection 
The writer obtained all data from financial reports listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) during 2011-2013 periods. 
In this work the writer excluded companies that were in 
property, real estate and financial sectors. Since they had a 
different financial structure, the cost of equity cannot be 
comparable with other industries. The writer also excluded 
companies that reported their financial statements in 
currencies other than rupiah to avoid biased number. The work 
also evades data from companies that did not submit financial 
statements consecutively during 2011-2013. The final data 
input consisted of 209 firms and 627 firm-year observations in 
year 2011-2013. After sorted, the final data sample consisted 
of 440 firm-year observation. 
Research Model 
Research that is done towards predicted variables 
influence cost of equity in dividend-growth model. 
Therefore analysis using interaction regression is formulated 
as: 
Analysis without earnings informativeness as moderation: 
BE PEGi,t = α0 + α1ALi,t + α2PLi,t + α3TLi,t + α4SIZEi,t + 
α5ROAi,t +  α6LEVi,t + εi,t  ……………………………   (1) 
Analysis with earnings informativeness as moderation: 
BE PEGi,t = α0 + α1Ali,t + α2PLi,t + α3TLi,t + α4 KLi,t + 
α5ALi,t*KLi,t + α6PLi,t*KLi,t +  α7TLi,t*KLi,t + α8SIZEi,t + 
α9ROAi,t + α10LEVi,t+εi,t………………….………… (2) 
where: 
BE PEG :  Cost of equity using Price Earning Growth Model ; 
KL : Earnings Informativeness;  
AL : Earnings Aggressiveness; 
PL : Income Smoothing; 
TL : Earnings Trnsparency; 
SIZE : Size of the company based on log assets; 
ROA : Return on Asset; Nett Profit divided by  
    Total asset.  
LEV :Leverage; and 
ε : Error term. 
i : Company. 
t : Year 
Normality Test 
The test is done by analyzing normal graph of probability plot. 
Besides using graph analysis, Skewness and Kurtosis tests are 
also used. The target value is to hit lower than the Critical 
Ration of 2,58 which means normal. 
Multicollinearity Test 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used to detect 
multicollinearity. If VIF results more than ten (10) means 
there might be multicollinearity among independent 
variables. In other words, regression model is stated to be 
free from multicollinearity if VIF scores less than 10. 
Autocorrelation Test 
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The test to the third assumption in classic regression linier 
model is autocorrelation. Durbin-Watson test is used in this 
research to test the existence of autocorrelation. Numbers 
needed in the method are dL, dU, 4 – dL, and 4 – dU. 
There is no autocorrelation if the value of DW is close to two 
(2) or is between dU   and  4  –  dU; oppositely, 
autocorrelation happens if the value is close to zero (0); and 
negative autocorrelation happens if the value is close to four 
(4) . If DW value is between dL and dU or 4 – dU   and 4 –
dL, it includes in No-positive autocorrelation, therefore it is
decided as No-decision or Zone of Indecision. For analysis
where DW value is in Zone of Indecision, a run test is needed




 Discretionary accruals are used to measure earnings 
informativeness. This study uses cross-sectional model of 
modified Jones [24] and [6]; while discretionary accruals 
are shown in model [25] 
Daci, t = (ACi, t / Tai, t-1 ) -NACi, t (1) 
Where: 
ACi, t / Tai, t = ƅ0 (1 / TAi, t-1) + ƅ1 (ΔSALESi, t-ΔARi, t / 
TAi, t-1)+ ƅ2 (PPEi, t / TAi, t-1) 
NaCi, t = ƅ0 (1 / Tai, t-1) + ƅ1 (ΔSALESi, t-ΔARi, t / TAi, t-
1) + ƅ2 (PPEi, t / TAi, t-1)
AC = Accounting Accruals
TA = Total Assets
ƅ0, ƅ1, ƅ2 = estimated slope coefficient
DAC = Discretionary Accruals
NAC = Non-discretionary Accruals
2. Earnings aggressiveness
Earnings aggressiveness is measured by the 
formula [22]: 
Alt = (ΔCAt - ΔCLt - ΔCASHt + ΔSTDt - Dept. + ΔTPt) / 
TAt – 1     (2) 
where: 
Alt: Earnings aggressiveness period t; 
ΔCat: Changes in Current Assets (Current assett - Current 
asset-1); 
ΔCL: Change Current Liabilities excluding Short Term 
Debt (CLT - CLT-1); 
ΔCasht: Changes in Cash (Casht - Casht-1); 
ΔSTDt: Changes Short Term Debt (STDt - STDt-1); 
Dept: Depreciation and Amortization period t; 
ΔTPt: Change Tax Payable (TPT - TPT-1); 
Tat-1: Total Assets period t-1; 
3. Earnings Smoothing
Income smoothing is measured with a formula according
to  [17] which is calculated as:
PL = σ (EARN/Assett-1)/ σ (CFO/Assett-1)  (3) 
Where: 
PL :  Income Smoothing; 
Σ : Deviation Standard; 
CFO : Cash Flow Operating; 
EARN : Earnings (Net Income Before 
Extraordinary Items); 
4. Earnings Transparency
Transparency is not mentioned as an explicit purpose 
in FASB or IASB, but [12] noted that the conceptual 
framework is produced by standard setters’ perspective, 
both for "readily understandable" and "underlying 
economics “concepts. 
Earnings transparency is measured by the formula [5]: 
Calculating TRANSI: 
RETi, j, t = αI0 + αI1Ei, j, t / Pi, j, t-1 + αI2ΔEi, j, t / Pi, j, t-1 + 
ɛi, j, t      (4) 
Calculating TRANSIN: 
RETi, p, t = αIN0 + αIN1Ei, p, t / Pi, p, t-1 + αIN2ΔEi, p, t / Pi, 
p, t-1 + ɛi, p, t      (5) 
Transparency (TRANSi, t) is the sum of TRANSIj, t with 
TRANSINp, t 
Calculating TRANSI in the fourth model to get R2, this is 
estimated by the industry. 
Calculating TRANSIN contained in the fifth model is to 
get the R2 estimated by the portfolio. This portfolio is 
derived from the regression residuals industry [the first 
model] and then divided by 4 (four) portfolio each year. 
Where: 
j = industry 
p = portfolio 
RET = Annual Return is measured from the beginning 
after the company's fiscal financial year; 
E = Earning / NIBE; 
AE = Change Earnings / NIBE; 
P = Price / Price beginning of the year; 
ΔP = Change Price / Price; 
A high regression of the return-earnings happens as an 
indication of earnings transparency’s growth [5]. 
5. Cost of Equity
This study uses the formula based on Prices Earnings 
Growth Model [26] to measure the size of cost of equity. 
BE PEG = √P/E Ratio/Earnings Growth Rate   (6) 
Where: 
BE PEG       = Cost of Equity based on Price 
Earnings Growth Model, calculated by √Price Earnings  
[PE] ratio divided by the short-term earnings growth rate; 
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P/E Ratio     = P0/eps1 
Earnings Growth Rate = 100*(eps2-eps1) 
Eps   = Earnings Per Share 
P0   = Prices Earnings. 
6. Control variables:
Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets [17]. 
Performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) = 
net income divided by total assets [27]. And Leverage / 
Lev are measured by total debt divided by the book value 
of equity and book value of debt [28]. 
IV. EVIDENCE ON THE EARNINGS AGGRESSIVENESS, INCOME
SMOOTHING, AND EARNINGS TRANSPARENCY ON THE COST
OF EQUITY AND EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS AS 
MODERATING 
Descriptive Statistics 
In statistic descriptive, research models are about relations 
among earnings aggressiveness, income smoothing and 
earnings transparency towards earnings informativeness as 
moderation. The samples are 209 entities of companies within 
three years: 2011, 2012 and 2013 which result in 627 
observations. Number of samples decreased to 187 
observations after the error normality test was conducted. This 
number is the outlier data which turns to 440 observations or 
440/627= 70% from the total number of earlier observations. 




Table 1 shows the minimum and the maximum value of 
cost of equity. 1.5% and 133% present the amount of return 
the investor will get from their investments. 571% of mean 
value shows the average amount of return gained by the 
companies from their investments. 
Earnings aggressiveness shows minimum value of -
0.278 and maximum value of 6.243 with standard deviation of 
0.510 [greater than mean value 0.899]. Greater value of 
deviation means the date points are higher than data value. 
41% of the sampled companies show earnings aggressiveness 
because they have bigger standard deviation than the mean of 
0.42. 
Income smoothing shows -5.65 as minimum value and 
0.58 as the maximum. The minimum value represents 
companies that perform income smoothing and the maximum 
value means the opposite. Standard deviation value [0.460] is 
higher than the mean with difference of 0.639. This indicates 
the sample do smooth earnings policy. The mean value -0.018 
[or less than 1] indicates that most of the companies do 
income smoothing. It is supported by the data that shows that 
118 companies have negative value of income smoothing 
while the value of the other 39 companies is higher than zero. 
Earnings Transparency shows a minimum value of 0,038 
and a maximum value of 0,751. Since minimum and 
maximum values are positive and the average value is 0.340 or 
34% means most companies revealed the earnings 
transparency by showing industry specifications and portfolios 
that can explain the return / yield in the explanation of the 
company's profit. Positive and rising value of earnings 
transparency shows the increasing transparency in companies 
[5]. 
Earnings informativeness show the average value of -
21.6%, which means companies sampled have high earnings 
informativeness. High number in earnings informativeness is 
used by investors to predict future earnings by combining the 
information from other sources e.g. stock prices. 
Variable of size results in mean 15.13. This number 
shows that companies have big assets. The size number comes 
from logarithm from the total of companies’ assets. 
In ROA with a minimum value of 0,000 and a maximum 
of 1,000 means that there are companies that are not able to 
produce a sample of a profit or break even. While the 
maximum value of 1.000 means that there are some firms that 
have the ability to make a total profit. ROA value is averagely 
of 126%, means that on averagely companies have the ability 
to make a profit of 126% of the total assets employed. 
The average leverage value is 58% means the firms have 
a debt ratio greater than the value of their equity. 
Normality Test 
.Normality test for research model before moderation using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows 0,084 which is bigger than 
0,05. That means data distributes normally. 
Research model after moderation conducted using the same 
test shows 0,154 –bigger than 0,05 which means the data 
spreads as usual. 
Multicolleration Test 
Research models prior moderation show the VIF values of the 
six variables are lower than 10 (VIF<10). Earnings 
aggressiveness results in 1,009 VIF value. And income 
smoothing results in 1,016 VIF value. While controlled 
variables result as follow: size 1,019; ROA 1,021; and 
Leverage 1,035. Based on the results of the test it is concluded 
that the six variables included in regression models are free 
from multicolleration issues.  
The research model following moderation shows that the ten 
variables result in less than 10 VIF values. EA: 3,747; ES: 
2,000; ET: 1,372; EI: 5,680; AL*KL: 3,951; PL*KL: 2,241; 
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TL*KL: 5,884; While controlled variables, those are: Size: 
1,034; ROA: 1,028; and Leverage: 1,053. 
Based on these test results we can conclude that the ten 
variables in regression models are free from multicolleration 
problem. 
Autocorrelation Test 
In research model before moderation, autocorrelation test –
which is stated in Durbin-Watson value (DW)- resulted in 
1,828. Therefore it can be concluded, with samples of 627 
observations and six independent variables, dl= 1,707; du= 
1,831; 4-dl= 2,293; 4-du= 2,169. Research model is showing 
1,828 which is in no autocorrelation area.  
Following the moderation, the autocorrelation test resulted in 
1,798 DWstat. Therefore it can be concluded that with 627 
observations using the ten independent variables result in: dl = 
1,707; du= 1,831; 4-DL = 2,293; 4-DU = 2,169. So model 
with DWstat 1,798 is in no autocorrelation area.  
TABLE 2 
Result Before Moderation 
BE PEGi,t = α0 + α1Ali,t + α2PLi,t + α3TLi,t + α4SIZEi,t + 
α5ROAi,t + α6LEVi,t+εi,t 
*** Significance at the 1% level; ** Significance at the 5% level; * 
Significance at 10% 
Note: BE PEG is the cost of equity based on Prices Earnings Growth Model 
which is calculated by √Price Earnings (PE) ratio divided by the short-term 
earnings growth rate. AL is earnings aggressiveness which is calculated by 
total accruals. PL is the income smoothing calculated by σ (EARN/Asset
t-1
)/ σ 
(CFO/Assett-1). TL is the earnings transparency calculated from the sum (R2) 
industry transparency and (R2) the transparency of the portfolio. KL is 
calculated from the earnings informativeness using discretionary accrual. Size 
is calculated from the logarithm of total assets. Return on Assets ROA is 
calculated by net income divided by total assets. Lev is leverage calculated on 
the total book receivables divided by total equity and book value of debt. 
TABLE 3 
Result After Moderation 
BE PEGi, t = α0 + α1Ali, t + α2PLi, t + α3TLi, t + α4KLi, t 
+ α5ALi, t * KLI, t + α6PLi, t * KLI, t + α7TLi, t * KLI, t
+ α8SIZEi, t + α9ROAi, t + α10LEVi, t + εi, t
*** Significance at the 1% level; ** Significance at the 5% level; * 
Significance at 10% 
Note: BE PEG is the cost of equity-based Prices Earnings Growth Model 
which is calculated by √Price Earnings (PE) ratio divided by the short-term 
earnings growth rate. AL is earnings aggressiveness which is calculated by 
total accruals. PL is the income smoothing calculated by σ (EARN/Asset
t-1
)/ σ 
(CFO/Assett-1). TL is the earnings transparency calculated from the sum (R2) 
industry transparency and (R2) the transparency of the portfolio. KL is 
calculated from the earnings informativeness using discretionary accrual. Size 
is calculated by the logarithm of total assets. Return on Assets ROA is 
calculated by net income divided by total assets. Lev is leverage calculated by 
the total book receivables divided by total equity and book value of debt. 
The first R-Square model results in 0,200 coefficient and F = 
17,993 (sig. 0,000). This means the first model fulfills 
goodness of fit in a level less than 1% -which is (0,000). 
Behavior or variation from independent variable is able to 
explain the same ones of the dependent as 20%. And the 
remainder 80% is explained by other variables    that are not 
included in the model. 
The second model shows that R-square generates coefficient 
0,217 and F = 11,870. This means the second model also gives 
in the goodness of fit in a level less than 1% -which is 0,000. 
And behavior or variation from independent variable can 
describe the same things of the dependent as 21,7%. The rest 
of 78,3% is analyzed by other variables that are excluded from 
the model. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis states that earnings aggressiveness 
generates a positive effect on the cost of equity. Test results in 
Table 2 show R2 18.8% with F-statistic 17,993. Earnings 
aggressiveness coefficient is 0.123, reflects significant 
positive profit at the level of 1% (t = 1.499; sig. 0.002). This 
indicates that a significant increase level point in earnings 
aggressiveness is associated with the increase in cost of 
equity. Statistics show that earnings aggressiveness influences 
investors in deciding policies. 
With these test results, we can conclude that the results 
support the hypothesis that earnings aggressiveness effects 
positively on the cost of equity. 
The results of this study also proves that reported 
earnings aggressiveness gives a negative signal to investors, 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.4 No.4, October 2016
©The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access by the GSTF.
22
thus leading to increased of cost of equity. This is in 
accordance with the signal theory, that the market will provide 
a positive response to the policies that can enhance the value 
of the company [22]. 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis states that income smoothing 
creates positive effect on the cost of equity. The test results in 
Table 2 shows R2 18.8% to 17.993 F-statistic. That 0,010 
income smoothing coefficient marking positive at 5% level (t 
= 0.968; sig. 0.027) indicates that a significant level of 2.7 
point rising in income smoothing associates with the increase 
in the cost of equity 0,010. Statistics show that income 
smoothing policy becomes a concern of investors in taking the 
decisions. 
We can conclude that the results support the hypothesis 
that income smoothing effects positively on the cost of equity. 
Income smoothing that correlates positively with the 
cost of equity is an indication that the management try to 
cover the variability in the underlying economic performance 
[19]. So it can be said that if the accounting profit is not 
smooth, the profit figures fail to represent the actual 
performance of the economy. In other words, this result means 
that the company doing earnings-smoothing policy will 
influence the response of investors (market) that is associated 
with the higher risk thus increasing the cost of equity. 
This is consistent with research [22]; [17]; and  [11]. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states that earnings transparency 
negatively affects the cost of equity. The test results in Table 2 
show R2 18.8% to 17.993 F-statistic. Earnings transparency 
coefficient is -0.276 with significant negative profit at the 
level of 1% (t = -1.821; sig. 0.000). This indicates that a level 
of 1 point increase in the earnings transparency is associated 
with a decrease in the cost of equity by -0.276. So it can be 
concluded that the test results support hypothesis 3 which says 
earnings transparency negatively affects the cost of equity. 
Companies were observed to have a tendency of not 
doing earnings transparency because when it resulted in high, 
the profit would represent the amount of change in the 
economic value of the company, so information asymmetry 
[the agency conflict] between the managers and owners of 
companies / investors will raise [5]. Therefore, companies 
tend to make low earning transparency to give a negative 
signal to investors. In accordance with the signal theory, the 
market (investors) will respond if the manager can make 
earnings transparency policy which can increase the value of 
companies that will impact on the cost of equity [5] 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis states that earnings 
informativeness weakens the relationship between earnings 
aggressiveness and cost of equity. Table 3 shows R2 19.8% 
with the F-statistic 11.870. Earnings aggressiveness variable in 
the second model has a coefficient of 0.251 which is positive 
and significant. Earnings informativeness acts as moderating 
variable between earnings aggressiveness and the cost of 
equity. In this case resulting a negative coefficient of -0.212 
and significant at 1% level; by t-test of -1.101 and a 
significance level of 0.014 (t = -1.101; sig 0.014). It indicates 
that earnings informativeness is valuable to investors. 
Effect of earnings aggressiveness in the cost of equity 
differs between companies with high and low earnings 
informativeness. Companies that are high in earnings 
informativeness and have a raise in earnings aggressiveness by 
one point will relate to 0,039 decrease of cost of equity. 
While companies with low earnings informativeness and 
having a one point increase in the earnings aggressiveness 
would be associated with a decrease in the cost of equity -
0.212. Based on these test results, high earnings 
informativeness is able to maintain negative relationship 
between earnings aggressiveness and cost of equity. 
When earnings informativeness is able to weaken the 
positive relationship between the earnings aggressiveness to 
the cost of equity, means the company does an earnings 
aggressiveness practice but has good earnings 
informativeness. Then the investor (market) responds to 
reduce the level of risk that decreases the cost of equity [22] 
and  [29]. 
Hypothesis 5 
The fifth hypothesis states that earnings 
informativeness weakens positive relation between income 
smoothing and cost of equity. Table 3 shows R2 19.8% with 
the F-statistic 11.870. 
Income smoothing variable in the second model has a 
coefficient of 0.009, which means positive and significant. 
When earnings informativeness acts as moderating variable 
between income smoothing and the cost of equity, it results a 
coefficient of 0.004 and a negative, but not significant, by t-
test of 0.193 and a significance level of 0.350 (t = 0.193; sig 
0.350). This indicates that earnings informativeness is not 
valuable for investors. Based on these test results, the earnings 
informativeness is not able to moderate relation between 
incomes smoothing to the cost of equity. 
The result to the fifth hypothesis mentions that earnings 
informativeness does not give significant moderation between 
income smoothing and cost of equity. The average value of 
income smoothing mounts to 1.079 so that a value above 1, 
meaning not smooth, is considered too high that is not able to 
be moderated by earnings informativeness using discretionary 
accruals measurement. 
Earnings informativeness that cannot function as 
moderation between income smoothing and cost of equity is 
caused by information asymmetry. The information 
asymmetry happens when the management uses its private 
information in doing income smoothing policy through net-
income-before-extraordinary-items (NIBE), which results in 
false value in non-economic income smoothing. On the other 
hand, according to agency theory, management is obliged to 
raise the value of the company. This study is in line with 
research [11] which states income smoothing that results are 
way above one or not smooth conclude in high cost of equity 
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that cannot be moderated by earnings informativeness through 
discretionary accrual. 
 
Hypothesis 6  
 The sixth hypothesis states that earnings 
informativeness strengthens negative relation between 
earnings transparency and cost of equity. Table 3 shows R2 
19.8% with the F-statistic 11.870. Earnings transparency 
variable in the second model has a coefficient of -0.341, which 
means negative and significant. Earnings informativeness acts 
as moderating variable in interaction between earnings 
transparency and the cost of equity has a negative coefficient 
of -0.401 and significant at the 5% level; by t-test of -0.967 
and significance level of 0.027 (t = -0.967; sig 0.027), means 
that the earnings informativeness is valuable to investors. 
 Effects of earnings transparency to cost of equity 
for companies would differ depending on the level of earnings 
informativeness. Companies having high earnings 
informativeness with 2,7 points of raise in earnings 
transparency will experience -0,742 decrease of cost of equity. 
While companies having low earnings informativeness with 
the same points of raise in earnings transparency will 
experience -0,341 decrease of cost of equity. Based on those 
tests, earnings informativeness as moderating variable is able 
to strengthen negative relation between earnings transparency 
to cost of equity. 
 Earnings transparency that reflects changes of 
companies’ economics can be understood by investors. This is 
in line with research [5] that says earnings transparency 
correlates negatively with cost of equity. And with earnings 
informativeness strengthen the negative relation, it is able to 
mitigate risks which at the end leads to reduced cost of equity. 
This means Indonesian stock market is leading to half-strong 
efficient market where investors respond more quickly to 
management policies –in this case: financial statements and 
other supplemental information, such as national financial 
regulation [30]. 
V. CONDUCT SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Alternative Cost of Equity Models 
The cost of equity for sensitivity analysis using the Dividend 
Growth Model [22] which is calculated by the formula: 
 
BE DIVt = the current dividend yield x (1 + g) + g  (1) 
 
Where: 
BE DIVt or re: The cost of equity-based Dividend Growth 
Model period t; 
P0: The ex-dividend Current Market Price of a Share = (The 
Current Market Price per share x D0); 
D0: The Current Dividend; 
g: The Expected Future Dividend Growth Rate; 
= ((D0 - D0-1) / D0-1); 
The Current Dividend Yield = D0 / The Current Market Price 
per share. 
In the measurement of Dividend Growth Model assuming the 
dividend growth rates follow a random walk, the cost of equity 
can be estimated using dividend yields because it has many 
advantages: it is able to observe, stable and stationary so that 
the accuracy of the changes in the cost of equity faced with the 
precision of a change of dividend yields will be confirmed 
positively. Loss is due to repurchase of stock and changes in 
the growth opportunities but it is not a problem in the growing 
market for repurchases is minor [22].  
 
Alternative Income Smoothing Models 
The income smoothing for sensitivity analysis using Norm 
Eckel  [31] which is calculated by the formula : 
 
( CVΔI / CVΔS )     (2) 
 
Where; 
CV = coefficient of variation ; 
ΔI = change in earnings ( income) ; and 




 TABLE 4 
Result Before Moderation 
BE DIVi,t = α0 + α1Ali,t + α2PLi,t + α3TLi,t + α4SIZEi,t + 
α5ROAi,t + α6LEVi,t+εi,t 
 
*** Significance at the 1% level ; ** Significance at the 5 % level ; * 
Significance at 10 % 
Note: BE DIV is the cost of equity based on Dividend Growth Model 
which is calculated from the current dividend yield x ( 1 + g ) + g . 
AL is earnings aggressiveness, calculated by total accruals. PL is the 
income smoothing, calculated by the coefficient of variation Δ profit 
divided by the coefficient of variation Δ sales. TL is the earnings 
transparency, calculated from the sum ( R2 ) industry transparency 
and ( R2 ) the earnings transparency of the portfolio . Size is 
calculated from the logarithm of total assets. Return on Assets ROA 
is calculated from net income divided by total assets. Lev is leverage 
calculated on the total book receivables divided by total equity and 
book value of debt. 
 
TABLE 5 
Result After Moderation 
BE DIVi, t = α0 + α1Ali, t + α2PLi, t + α3TLi, t + α4KLi, t 
+ α5ALi, t * KLI, t + α6PLi, t * KLI, t + α7TLi, t * KLI, t 
+ α8SIZEi, t + α9ROAi, t + α10LEVi, t + εi, t 
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*** Significance at the 1% level; ** Significance at the 5 %  level; * 
Significance at 10 % 
Note: BE DIV is the cost of equity based on Dividend Growth Model 
which is calculated from the current dividend yield x ( 1 + g ) + g . 
AL is earnings aggressiveness, calculated by total accruals. PL is the 
income smoothing, calculated by coefficient of variation Δ profit 
divided by the coefficient of variation Δ sales. TL is the earnings 
transparency, calculated from the sum ( R2 ) industry transparency 
and ( R2 ) the earnings transparency of the portfolio . Size is 
calculated from the logarithm of total assets. Return on Assets ROA 
is calculated from net income divided by total assets. Lev is leverage, 
calculated on the total book receivables divided by total equity and 
book value of debt. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis states that earnings aggressiveness has 
positive effect on the cost of equity. Test results contained in 
Table 4 show R2 11.8% with the F-statistic 4.489. Earnings 
aggressiveness having coefficient of 0.619 and a significant 
positive at the level of 1% (t = 1.848; sig. 0.000) indicates that 
a significant level point increase in eanings aggressiveness is 
associated with the increase in cost of equity of 0.619. 
Statistics show that the earnings aggressiveness policy relates 
to investors in making the decisions. It is concluded that the 
earnings aggressiveness has significant positive effect on the 
cost of equity. 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis stated income smoothing has positive 
effect on the cost of equity. Test results contained in Table 4 
shows R2 of 11.8% with the F-statistic 4.489. Income 
smoothing having coefficient of 0.272 and a significant 
positive point at 10% (t = 0.732; sig. 0.073) indicates that a 
significant level of 7.3 point rising in income smoothing is 
associated with the increase in the cost of equity 0.272. 
Statistics show that income smoothing policy has become a 
concern of investors in making decisions. It is concluded that 
income smoothing has significant positive effect on the cost of 
equity. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis states earnings transparency has 
negatively affect the cost of equity. The test results show that 
earnings transparency does not have a significant effect on the 
cost of equity. In table 4 shows regression coefficient on the 
earnings transparency variable -0.064 and statistically 
insignificant, amounting to 0.449 or less at the 5% 
significance level (t = -0.065; sig. 0.449). It can be concluded 
that the earnings transparency has not affected significantly to 
the cost of equity. 
Hypothesis 4 
The fourth hypothesis states that earnings informativeness 
weakens the relationship between the earnings aggressiveness 
and the cost of equity. Table 5 shows R2 18.5% with 4,534 F-
statistic. Earnings aggressiveness variable in the second model 
has a coefficient of -1.111 and significant interaction model 
variable. Earnings informativeness acting as moderating 
variable between earnings aggressiveness and the cost of 
equity has a positive coefficient of 2.108 and is significant at 
the 1% level; with t-stat of 1,725 and a significance level of 
0.001 (t = 1.725; sig 0.001). This indicates that the earnings 
informativeness is valuable to investors. 
Effects of earnings aggressiveness to cost of equity for 
companies would differ depending on the level of earnings 
informativeness. Companies that have a high profit level 
earnings informativeness having a significance one point 
increase in the earnings aggressiveness will relate to -1.003 (-
1.111 coefficient reduced coefficient of  0.108) reduction in 
the cost of equity. While in companies with low earnings 
informativeness, having an increase by one point in the 
earnings aggressiveness would be associated with a decrease -
1.111 in the cost of equity. Based on these test results, 
earnings informativeness as a moderating variable has 
weakened the positive relationship between the earnings 
aggressiveness to the cost of equity. 
Hypothesis 5 
The fifth hypothesis states that earnings informativeness 
weakens the relationship between income smoothing and the 
cost of equity. Table 5 shows that the earnings 
informativeness acting as the moderating variable between 
income smoothing and the cost of equity has a positive 
coefficient of -6.438 and significant at the level of 5%; by t-
test of -1.067 and a significance level of  0.005 (t = 1.725; sig 
0.018). This indicates that the earnings informativeness is 
valuable to investors. 
Effect of income smoothing of the cost of equity would differ 
depending on the level of earnings informativeness. 
Companies that with high earnings informativeness with a 
significance level of 1.8 points increase in income smoothing 
will relate to -6.690 (-6.438 coefficient reduced coefficient 
0.252) reduction in the cost of equity. While companies that 
have low earnings informativeness with the significance level 
of 1.8 points rise in income smoothing will be related to 0.252 
increases in the cost of equity. Based on these test results, high 
earnings informativeness  as a moderating variable has able to 
weaken the positive relationship between income smoothing 
and the cost of equity, so the fifth hypothesis are accepted. 
Hypothesis 6 
The sixth hypothesis states that earnings informativeness has 
strengthen negative link between earnings transparency and 
the cost of equity. Table 5 shows earnings transparency 
variable in the second model has a coefficient of 0.565 but not 
significant in the interaction model variables with t-stat equal 
to 0.577 and a significance level of over 10 % ( t = 0.577 ; sig 
0.126 ). This means earnings informativeness is not worthy for 
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investors. Based on these test results, eanings informativeness 
as a moderating variable is not able to strengthen the relation 
between earnings transparency to the cost of equity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Earnings aggressiveness has a positive effect on the 
cost of equity. This result means that companies tend to report 
earnings policy too aggressively, which makes the market 
interpret a high risk therefore increase cost of equity, this is 
parallel to research [22]; [17]; and [29].  
 Income smoothing has positive effect on the cost of 
equity. This result means that the company pursuing a policy 
of smoothing earnings will influence the response of investors 
[market] that is associated with the higher risk thus increasing 
the cost of equity. This is consistent with research [22];  [17]; 
and  [11]. 
 Earnings transparency affects negatively to cost of 
equity. This means companies doing earnings transparency 
policy –which reflects changes in companies’ economic 
condition- can be understood or well responded by investors. 
Since investors consider a high risk to companies’ cash flow 
in the future, it will reduce cost of equity [5]. 
 Earnings informativeness is able to weaken positive 
relation between earnings aggressiveness and cost of equity.  
This means that companies reporting good earnings 
informativeness is appreciated by investors by reducing risk 
level, therefore cost of equity is decreased [22] and  [29]. 
 Earnings informativeness is not able to weaken positive 
relation between income smoothing and cost of equity. This 
happens when management of companies does income 
smoothing policy using companies’ non-economic factors that 
investors and stakeholders are not aware of, thus creates 
agency conflicts. In the contrary, reliable earnings 
informativeness brings reduction in cost of equity because 
investors consider risks can be mitigated. This interpretation is 
in line with research   [11] and [29]. 
 Convincing earnings informativeness strengthens 
relation between earnings transparency and cost of equity. 
This means earningd transparency policy can be responded by 
investors even though earnings informativeness is high, thus 
brings significant change in cost of equity. This result is 
aligned with research [5]. 
The research implication is for the market to use accrual 
as a signal to decide required of return. This means 
management needs to observe accounting policy to show 
quality information –which focus on minimalizing accrual 
abnormal component. Therefore management shows company 
policies that focus on corporate’s economic phenomena to 
increase company’s value. 
Another implication is for investors to respond accrual 
component empirically. In order to achieve this, accounting 
standard boards need to consider accounting policy that 
minimalize abnormal accrual potential. Hence decisions taken 
by academics or professionals should base on prudence 
principle. 
Research limitation defines as measuring the cost of 
equity using random walk assumption. This means the 
measurement need market price which change independently 
and is not affected by other prices and that the price moves in 
an unplanned order, thus today’s price is unaffected by the 
previous figure. This happens because the price set today 
depends on new information entering and accepted by the 
market.  
 In the future research, the analyst may consider other 
variable measurement such as income smoothing to changing 
correlation measurement in discretionary accrual and in pre-
discretionary accrual [11]; earnings informativeness to Future 
Earnings Response Coefficient/ FERC; and cost of equity to 
Capital Asset Pricing Model/ CAPM. Also, the analyst may 
examine variables used in the research, such as Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Corporate Good Governance to see 
collaborative administration which affects financial statement 
disclosure.  
 Besides, it is suggested to the analyst to examine cross 
country units, such as ASEAN, to compare how investors 
respond to global risk. 
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